Jurisdiction Clauses in New Zealand Law by Keyes, Mary
  631 
JURISDICTION CLAUSES IN NEW 
ZEALAND LAW 
Mary Keyes 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts 2010, mirror legislation in New Zealand and Australia, regulate 
the allocation of jurisdiction in trans-Tasman civil proceedings. The legislation includes provisions 
dealing with the effects of jurisdiction clauses. This article considers the treatment of jurisdiction 
clauses under the statutory regime and the common law regime which provides for the effect of 
jurisdiction clauses that are outside the scope of the legislation, how these regimes differ, and their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Jurisdiction clauses are contractual provisions which nominate the courts in which the parties 
agree to litigate in the event of a dispute arising. With the growth in cross-border trade and commerce, 
and the use of technology to facilitate the use of standard forms, jurisdiction clauses have become 
commonplace in commercial and non-commercial contracts alike.1 The law in relation to their effect 
has accordingly become increasingly important in practical terms. 
While the New Zealand law on the effect of jurisdiction clauses was historically, and to some 
extent continues to be, strongly influenced by English case law,2 it has also developed somewhat 
distinctive characteristics. This is mainly as a result of the Agreement between the Government of 
  
  Professor, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia. 
1  The effect of jurisdiction clauses in non-commercial contracts raises interesting issues which, for reasons of 
space, are not considered in this article. 
2  English private international law has in recent decades been heavily influenced by European Union 
legislation. In the context of jurisdiction, the European Union's Brussels I Recast Regulation applies in many 
cases before the English courts. This Regulation is not comprehensive, and therefore residual national law 
retains a role in all member states. Whereas the New Zealand law has in general not been influenced by the 
European Union law that is required to be applied in many English cases, English cases applying the residual 
national English law continue to be cited in New Zealand decisions: see for example Heli Holdings Ltd v 
Chopper Worx Pty Ltd [2018] NZHC 3276 at [50], citing Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore 
Partners LP [2009] EWCA 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023 (see further below nn 119 and 124 and associated text). 
At the time of writing, the consequences of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union for 
English private international law are unclear. 
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New Zealand and the Government of Australia on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory 
Enforcement,3 entered into between New Zealand and Australia in 2008, and given effect to by 
legislation in each country called the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010,4 which entered into force 
in 2013. This legislation creates, amongst other things,5 a regime regulating the allocation of 
jurisdiction in trans-Tasman civil litigation, including where the parties have made agreements about 
jurisdiction. This regime differs in important respects from the common law regime, which determines 
the effect of jurisdiction clauses outside the scope of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. This article 
considers and compares the operation of these two regimes, demonstrating that while exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses are better protected under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act than under the 
common law, the common law is arguably superior in terms of dealing with the complexities of 
international commercial litigation. 
It is conventional to distinguish the positive from the negative effects of jurisdiction clauses. This 
distinction depends on whether the jurisdiction clause nominates the courts of the forum (here, of 
New Zealand), or of a foreign country. The positive effect of a jurisdiction clause refers to whether, 
according to the law of the forum, the jurisdiction clause nominating the forum court is effective to 
establish the jurisdictional competency of that court. This relates to the primary issue as to whether a 
court has the authority to hear and determine a dispute, notwithstanding the international character of 
the dispute. The negative effect of a jurisdiction clause refers to whether, according to the law of the 
forum, the forum court will decline to exercise jurisdiction because of the jurisdiction clause, 
notwithstanding that the forum is otherwise competent. Most of the law and commentary on 
jurisdiction clauses is concerned with their negative effects (which are addressed in Part III), but it is 
necessary first to consider the positive effect of jurisdiction clauses which nominate New Zealand 
courts (addressed in Part II). 
  
3  The Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia on Trans-Tasman 
Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement [2008] NZTS 6 (signed 24 July 2008, entered into force 11 
October 2013) is sch 1 to the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010. 
4  In both countries, the legislation has the same name. The focus of this article is on the New Zealand legislation; 
the Australian legislation contains mirror provisions (albeit differently numbered). 
5  The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts comprehensively deal with a range of matters, including "regulatory 
enforcement" as well as "court proceedings". Its provisions in relation to court proceedings are not limited to 
civil proceedings; the relevant provisions of the legislation, for the purposes of the discussion in this article, 
are those relating to the allocation of jurisdiction in trans-Tasman litigation. This article is primarily focused 
on the regulation of agreements about jurisdiction, but the legislation also addresses the allocation of 
jurisdiction where there is no agreement on jurisdiction. That question is beyond the scope of this article: see 
further Reid Mortensen "A Trans-Tasman Judicial Area: Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in the Single 
Economic Market" (2010) 16 Canta LR 61 at 70–80; and Reid Mortensen "Together Alone: Integrating the 
Tasman World" in Andrew Dickinson, Mary Keyes and Thomas John (eds) Australian Private International 
Law for the 21st Century: Looking Outwards (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) 113 at 125–131. 
 JURISDICTION CLAUSES IN NEW ZEALAND LAW 633 
  
II  THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF JURISDICTION CLAUSES 
In New Zealand, as in other common law systems, the court's jurisdictional competence in an 
international case depends principally on whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.6 In 
common law systems, personal jurisdiction is defined by the defendant's amenability to service of the 
court's initiating process. Amenability to service depends on whether the defendant is present in the 
jurisdiction at the time of service.7 If not, the court lacks jurisdiction even if the defendant has 
contractually submitted to the jurisdiction.8 This strict territorial limit has been overcome by 
legislation which enables service of process outside the jurisdiction in a wide range of circumstances, 
depending on whether the litigation is within the scope of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, or not.  
In the context of establishing the court's jurisdiction over foreign defendants, trans-Tasman 
litigation is regulated very differently to international litigation outside the trans-Tasman context. The 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act enables service of the initiating process of a New Zealand court in 
Australia9 without requiring either the leave of the court or any nexus to New Zealand.10 The 
existence of a jurisdiction clause in which the parties agree to litigate in, or to submit to the jurisdiction 
of, the New Zealand courts neither creates nor enhances those courts' competence under this regime; 
instead, it is material to the question of whether the court will exercise its jurisdiction, which is 
considered in Part III. 
Where the defendant is in a foreign country other than Australia, service of process outside New 
Zealand is largely regulated by rules of court.11 This regime differs from the trans-Tasman regime in 
that the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant requires a connection to New Zealand, of 
either the defendant or some aspect of the dispute. The rules of court in New Zealand enable service 
out of the jurisdiction without leave in a wide range of such circumstances. Relevant to the discussion 
in this article, the rules enable service out of the jurisdiction without the prior leave of the court "when 
  
6  The court must also have subject-matter jurisdiction to deal with the issues in dispute; this is rarely contested, 
but see further below nn 15–16 and associated text. 
7  Von Wyl v Engeler [1998] 3 NZLR 416 (CA) at 421. 
8  British Wagon Co v Gray [1896] 1 QB 35 (CA). In common law systems, including New Zealand, the 
defendant's failure to challenge the court's jurisdiction, if they are entitled to do so (for example, if they were 
not present at the time of service), is regarded as a submission to the jurisdiction, which is also a sufficient 
basis of jurisdiction at common law: see for example Von Wyl v Engeler, above n 7, at 421. This type of 
unilateral submission (evidenced by an omission to object to the jurisdiction) operates quite differently to an 
ex ante bilateral contractual agreement to jurisdiction, and is therefore outside the scope of this article.  
9  Section 13(1). 
10  Section 13(3)(b). 
11  Several other statutes facilitate service outside the jurisdiction: see for example the Employment Court 
Regulations 2000, reg 31A. 
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the person to be served has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court".12 A jurisdiction clause which 
nominates the courts of New Zealand as a venue for litigation (whether exclusively or not) is regarded 
as a submission to the jurisdiction; therefore such a clause facilitates service out of the jurisdiction on 
a foreign defendant even if there is no other connection between the litigation and New Zealand. The 
rules authorise service outside the jurisdiction in a range of other circumstances,13 so that the New 
Zealand courts may assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants even though the parties have 
contractually agreed to litigate in a foreign court or courts. The effect of any such agreement is 
relevant to whether the New Zealand court will stay or dismiss the proceedings, or grant some other 
relief, which is addressed in detail in Part III. 
In addition to personal jurisdiction, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction: that is, it must 
be competent to deal with the claims and defences.14 Subject-matter jurisdiction is not often in issue 
but it has become more relevant given the growth in importance of statutory claims and defences.15 
This might be relevant if a party relies on peculiar foreign legislation, in which case, the New Zealand 
court might find that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to deal with some aspects of the dispute. 
Subject-matter jurisdiction is not contractible; the parties' agreement to litigate in New Zealand courts 
cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a New Zealand court.16 
The fact of the New Zealand courts' jurisdictional competence is not the end of the matter. In 
international cases, jurisdiction is frequently challenged, and may be challenged on a number of 
different bases. This article is concerned with challenges to the jurisdiction which are based on the 
parties' agreements about jurisdiction, which is the focus of Part III. 
III THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF JURISDICTION CLAUSES 
The negative effect of a jurisdiction clause refers to its effect on the court's decision whether to 
exercise jurisdiction, which arises if the defendant challenges the jurisdiction.17 In this context, the 
effect of a jurisdiction clause depends on whether it is characterised as exclusive or non-exclusive. 
  
12  High Court Rules 2016, r 6.27(2)(k); and the District Court Rules 2014, r 6.23(2)(k). 
13  High Court Rules, r 6.27(2); and the District Court Rules, r 6.23(2). 
14  The issue whether the foreign court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is relevant to whether the forum court 
should stay or dismiss proceedings. 
15  A detailed discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent 
account, see Maria Hook "The 'statutist trap' and subject-matter jurisdiction" (2017) 13 J Priv Int L 435.  
16  Likewise, the parties cannot by agreement deprive courts, whether of New Zealand or otherwise, of subject-
matter jurisdiction which is exclusively theirs.  
17  See High Court Rules, r 5.49; and the District Court Rules, r 5.51. It may also arise if the plaintiff must seek 
the leave of the court to serve process out of the jurisdiction (which is necessary if none of the gateways to 
jurisdiction under the rules of court is satisfied): r 6.28 of the High Court Rules; and r 6.24 of the District 
Court Rules. The same considerations arise in cases such as when the defendant challenges the jurisdiction. 
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A The Distinction Between Exclusive and Non-exclusive Jurisdiction 
Clauses 
A fundamental distinction is drawn in New Zealand, as in other legal systems, between exclusive 
and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses. While that distinction has been cogently criticised,18 the 
distinction remains basic to the law.19 As explained in detail below, exclusive and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses have different effects in terms of whether a court will exercise its jurisdiction and 
therefore distinguishing whether a particular jurisdiction clause is exclusive or not is crucial in 
practice.  
1  Exclusive choice of court agreements under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings 
Act 2010 
The trans-Tasman regime is different to that applied in other cases, not only because the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act uses the term "exclusive choice of court agreement" rather than "jurisdiction 
clause". This reflects the terminology used in the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court 
Agreements (the Hague Choice of Court Convention),20 on which s 25 of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act is based. The use of this term in the Act has not affected the terminology used to 
describe these clauses which are still generally referred to as jurisdiction clauses. 
As already noted, the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act gives effect to a treaty between New 
Zealand and Australia.21 While the treaty itself does not explicitly address the effect of jurisdiction 
clauses, the legislation giving effect to it does. The provisions dealing with certain exclusive "choice 
of court agreements"22 were based on aspects of the Hague Choice of Court Convention and were 
  
18  Adrian Briggs Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 
118; Adrian Briggs "The Subtle Variety of Jurisdiction Agreements" [2012] LMCLQ 364; and Michelle Ong 
"Rethinking Jurisdiction Clauses in New Zealand: The Hague Convention and Beyond" (2013) 19 Auckland 
U L Rev 219. 
19  This is true both under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, which contains provisions applicable only to 
"exclusive choice of court agreements", and at common law, which continues to differentiate exclusive from 
non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 
20  Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (signed 30 June 2005, entered into force 1 
October 2015) [Hague Choice of Court Convention]. 
21  See above n 3. 
22  This is the term which is used in the Hague Choice of Court Convention, above n 20, as well as in the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25. In this section, the same terminology is used. 
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introduced in order to ensure that, if New Zealand and Australia adopted that Convention,23 the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act would be consistent with that.24 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act defines an "exclusive choice of court agreement" to mean a 
written agreement that "designates the courts, or a specified court or courts, of a specified country, to 
the exclusion of any other courts, as the court or courts to determine disputes".25 Consumer and 
employment contracts are specifically excluded from the definition of exclusive choice of court 
agreements.26 The definition in the Act resembles, but is not identical to, the definition of exclusive 
choice of court agreement in the Hague Choice of Court Convention.27 In particular, the Convention 
deems a choice of court agreement to be exclusive "unless the parties have expressly provided 
otherwise",28 whereas the Act contains no such presumption. Also, the Convention has a range of 
exclusions from its scope which are not expressly mentioned in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.29 
The New Zealand courts have not yet been called upon to apply the statutory definition of exclusivity. 
However, it has been suggested that the statutory definition is "functionally similar" to the common 
law definition.30 
2 The test of exclusivity at common law 
For cases outside the trans-Tasman regime, determining whether a jurisdiction clause is exclusive 
or non-exclusive is treated as a question of interpretation. This should be done according to the 
governing law of the jurisdiction agreement,31 which is presumed to be the same as the governing law 
of the contract as a whole. If the governing law is the law of New Zealand, the question is whether 
  
23  In 2016 (after the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts came into effect), the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
of the Australian Parliament recommended that Australia should accede to the Convention and that legislation 
entitled the International Civil Law Act should be drafted to bring it into effect: Joint Standing Committee on 
Treaties Report 166: Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness-USA; Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements-accession; GATT Schedule of Concessions-amendment; Radio Regulations-partial revision 
(November 2016) at 23. At the time of writing, legislation had not been introduced into the Australian 
Parliament. 
24  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 2010 (105-1) (explanatory note) at 4. 
25  Section 25(4)(a). 
26  Section 25(4)(b) (consumer agreements) and (c) (employment agreements). 
27  Compare Hague Choice of Court Convention, above n 20, art 3(a). 
28  Article 3(b). 
29  Article 2(2). 
30  Brooke Adele Marshall and Mary Keyes "Australia's Accession to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements" (2017) 41 MULR 246 at 252. 
31  It is not uncommon for courts to simply apply the law of the forum to this question without addressing the 
choice of law question at all. This is what was done in Universal Specialties Ltd v Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems Inc HC Auckland CP162/95, 2 May 1996 [Universal Specialties Ltd (HC)] per Tompkins J.  
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"on its true construction the clause obliges the parties to resort to [the nominated] jurisdiction", 
irrespective of whether the clause describes the nominated court's jurisdiction as being "exclusive".32 
There is limited consideration of the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction in 
the New Zealand case law. In Universal Specialties Ltd v Advanced Cardiovascular Systems Inc, 
Tompkins J took into account the fact that the jurisdiction clause gave the defendant, but not the 
plaintiff, an option to bring proceedings in another court, in holding that the jurisdiction of the 
Californian courts was exclusive so far as the plaintiff was concerned.33 In Eight Mile Style LLC v 
New Zealand National Party, Dobson J held that a clause which provided that "[t]his agreement … 
shall be construed in accordance with the laws and exclusive jurisdiction of the State of California of 
the USA"34 was not an exclusive jurisdiction clause, applying United States authorities that require 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses "to be stipulated in express terms".35 His Honour held that the clause 
was unclear because it did not specifically refer to the Californian courts,36 and also noted that the 
clause neither identified, nor enabled the inference of, its intended subject-matter scope.37 
B  The Effect of Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses 
One of the most significant differences between the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act and the 
common law jurisdictional regime is in relation to the effect of exclusive jurisdiction clauses on a 
court's decision whether to stay or dismiss proceedings.  
1  Exclusive choice of court agreements under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings 
Act 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, reflecting the Hague Choice of Court Convention, requires 
exclusive choice of court agreements to be strictly enforced with very limited exceptions. It deals 
separately with exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of New Zealand and Australian courts. 
  
32  Universal Specialties Ltd (HC), above n 31, at 7 per Tompkins J, citing Lawrence Collins (ed) Dicey and 
Morris on the Conflict of Laws (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1993) at 421. Dicey and Morris' formula 
was also approved and applied by the English Court of Appeal in Sohio Supply v Gatoil (USA) [1989] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 588 (CA) at 591; and Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Cia Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA) 
at 593–594. 
33  Universal Specialties Ltd (HC), above n 31, at 7–8 per Tompkins J. 
34  Eight Mile Style LLC v New Zealand National Party [2015] NZHC 2409 at [36]. 
35  At [38]. The reason for applying United States authorities is that United States law was the governing law of 
the jurisdiction clause. 
36  At [40]. 
37  At [41]. 
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Where the exclusive choice of court agreement nominates New Zealand courts, the Act provides 
that the New Zealand court "must not" stay its proceedings,38 unless the agreement is "null and void" 
under New Zealand law, including its rules of private international law.39 This is a significant change 
from the common law position, according to which the court usually enforces exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses, but always retains a discretion not to do so. Article 5(1) of the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention, on which this provision is based, is intended "to refer primarily to generally recognised 
grounds like fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, duress and lack of capacity".40 In the only New 
Zealand case to have considered this provision,41 it was not contended that the choice of New Zealand 
courts was null and void, so the exception is yet to be judicially considered. It is likely that the courts 
will construe the exception narrowly, consistent with the strict approach that New Zealand courts take 
to the exceptions to enforcement of arbitration agreements.42 
The Act also requires strong protection of exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of 
Australian courts. Where the exclusive choice of court agreement nominates an Australian court, the 
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act provides that the New Zealand court "must" stay the proceeding,43 
with five limited exceptions, which are derived from the exceptions in the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention.44 These exceptions are:45 
(a) where the agreement is null and void under Australian law, including Australian "rules of 
private international law";46 
  
38  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25(1)(b). 
39  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25(3). The reference to rules of private international law means New 
Zealand choice of law rules; in other words, the issue as to whether a choice of court agreement is null and 
void must be determined according to the governing law of the choice of court agreement (presumed to be 
the same as the governing law of the contract as a whole), which is identified by the New Zealand contract 
choice of law rules. 
40  Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: 
Explanatory Report (Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2013) at [126].  
41  Skelton v Z487 Ltd [2014] NZHC 707. 
42  See Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (t/a Zurich New Zealand) v Cognition Education Ltd [2014] NZSC 188. 
43  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25(1)(a). 
44  Hague Choice of Court Convention, above n 20, art 6. In turn, the exceptions in the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention are modelled on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 3 (signed 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) [the New York 
Convention]: see Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 40, at [147]. 
45  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25(2). 
46  This refers to Australian choice of law rules – in other words, this question is determined according to the 
governing law of the choice of court agreement, identified by reference to the Australian contract choice of 
law rules. 
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(b) where a party lacked capacity, under New Zealand law, to enter into the agreement;  
(c) where giving effect to the agreement "would lead to a manifest injustice or would be 
manifestly contrary to New Zealand public policy"; 
(d) where the agreement cannot reasonably be performed, for reasons beyond the parties' control; 
and 
(e) where the nominated court has decided not to determine matters within the scope of the 
agreement. 
At the time of writing, these exceptions have only been considered in one New Zealand case.47 In 
Skelton v Z487 Ltd, Lang J stated that "[i]t is likely … that the meaning to be attributed to the phrase 
['lead to a manifest injustice' in s 25] will be informed by the background against which the Act came 
to be passed",48 namely, that the provision was modelled on the Hague Choice of Court Convention, 
and that "[a]uthorities relating to the manner in which those articles have been interpreted are therefore 
likely to be relevant to the manner in which s 25(2) should be interpreted."49 At the time of writing, 
the Convention was in effect in Mexico, the member states of the European Union, Singapore and 
Montenegro.50 Authorities from these jurisdictions interpreting the exceptions under the Convention 
will be of assistance in interpreting the exceptions in s 25. However, the Convention only came into 
effect in 2015. Given that the exceptions to the enforcement of exclusive choice of court agreements 
are based on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the New York Convention), until the jurisprudence on the meaning of the Convention's 
exceptions develops, cases dealing with arbitration agreements will be instructive in the interpretation 
of these provisions.  
The first exception is when the choice of court agreement is null and void under Australian law, 
including the relevant Australian choice of law rule. By analogy to the narrow interpretation applied 
to the exceptions to enforcement of arbitration agreements by both Australian and New Zealand 
courts, this exception is likely to be strictly construed. Assuming that the governing law of the choice 
of court agreement was Australian law, the exception would be applicable when Australian legislation 
precluded contracting out, such as under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth),51 as well as where 
the choice of court agreement was procured by mistake, misrepresentation, fraud or duress. In an 
Australian case dealing with the mirror provision of the Australian Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, 
  
47  Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41. 
48  At [30]. 
49  At [30], n 3. 
50  See the Status Table for the Convention: HCCH "Status Table: 37: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of 
Court Agreements" <www.hcch.net/en/instruments>. 
51  Section 52 renders void a contractual provision purporting to "exclude, restrict or modify" the operation of 
the Act to the prejudice of a person other than the insurer.  
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Atkinson J of the Supreme Court of Queensland treated arguments that the choice of court agreement 
was vitiated by fraudulent misrepresentation or mistake as being relevant to whether the clause was 
null and void.52 
The second and fourth of the five exceptions, concerning the parties' capacity to enter into, and 
the frustration of, a choice of court agreement, seem very unlikely to arise in practice. There are no 
New Zealand or Australian cases in which these issues have arisen or been considered.53 
Consequently these two exceptions are not discussed any further here.54 
The third exception has two limbs, justifying non-enforcement where giving effect to the 
exclusive choice of court agreement would either "lead to a manifest injustice", or be "manifestly" 
incompatible with New Zealand public policy. In relation to the first limb, in Skelton v Z487 Ltd, the 
New Zealand plaintiff asserted that the enforcement of a choice of court agreement in favour of 
Australian courts would lead to a manifest injustice, because he suffered from significant health issues 
and claimed that he would therefore be unable to travel to Queensland to participate in a trial there. 
Justice Lang found that "the evidence does not establish that Mr Skelton could not travel to 
Queensland if that was necessary", and therefore he did not need to decide how the first limb should 
be interpreted.55 
In relation to the second limb, the public policy exception, the New Zealand courts already take 
an internationalist and restrictive approach to the application of New Zealand public policy generally, 
including in jurisdictional disputes involving foreign jurisdiction clauses.56 The inclusion of the 
qualifier "manifestly" in the Hague Choice of Court Convention is intended to establish a high 
threshold.57 As already noted, consumer and employment contracts – which entail obvious public 
policy concerns that might otherwise enliven this exception – are explicitly excluded from the 
definition of exclusive choice of court agreements in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.58 The public 
  
52  Z487 Ltd v Skelton [2014] QSC 309 at [72] and [75]. 
53  See Marshall and Keyes, above n 30, at 261–262. 
54  For detailed discussion of all five exceptions, see Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 40, at [146]–[159]; and 
Marshall and Keyes, above n 30, at 258–268. 
55  Skelton v Z487, above n 41, at [30]. 
56  See further below nn 85–86 and associated text. Similarly, the New Zealand courts apply a very high standard 
in relation to the public policy defence to the enforcement of foreign judgments. In Reeves v OneWorld 
Challenge LLC, the Court of Appeal said that the issue is whether enforcement would "'shock the conscience' 
of a reasonable New Zealander, or be contrary to New Zealand's view of basic morality or a violation of 
essential principles of justice or moral interests in New Zealand": Reeves v OneWorld Challenge LLC [2006] 
2 NZLR 184 (CA) at [67]. 
57  Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 40, at [153]. 
58  See above n 26 and associated text. 
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policy exception might be invoked in disputes arising from other contracts characterised by disparities 
in bargaining position, such as franchise and insurance contracts. The public policy exception would 
also be made out if New Zealand legislation either explicitly or implicitly invalidated a foreign choice 
of court agreement.59 
The final exception is where the Australian court, nominated in the exclusive choice of court 
agreement, has decided not to determine matters within the agreement's scope. This provision is 
misconceived. As explained above, in the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, the court nominated in an 
exclusive choice of court agreement is obliged to determine matters within the agreement's scope, 
unless the agreement is null and void under the law of the chosen court.60 That sole exception is 
already fully reflected in the first exception under s 25(2).61 There is no other basis on which a chosen 
court is expressly allowed, under the Act, to "decide not to" exercise its jurisdiction. This exception 
was adverted to in the only published New Zealand case62 dealing with the effect of exclusive choice 
of court agreements under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act: Skelton v Z487 Ltd.63 
Skelton v Z487 Ltd concerned disputes that arose from two agreements between the parties who 
were engaged in a long-term commercial relationship.64 The first agreement, concluded in 2008, 
contained an exclusive choice of New Zealand courts; the second agreement, concluded in 2010, 
contained an exclusive choice of Australian courts. The Australian party, Z487 Ltd, commenced 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland, seeking relief only under the 2008 agreement.65 A 
month later, the New Zealand party, Mr Skelton, brought proceedings in the High Court of New 
Zealand, seeking relief under both the 2008 and 2010 agreements.66 The defendant to each proceeding 
(the plaintiff in the proceedings in the other country) sought a stay under the relevant Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act, in each case relying on the exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of its 
preferred forum. 
  
59  For an example of an explicit invalidation, see the Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 210. A provision 
prohibiting contracting out might be interpreted to impliedly invalidate an exclusive choice of foreign court, 
for example s 5C(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
60  See above n 39 and associated text. 
61  See above nn 51–52 and associated text. 
62  Three Australian cases have considered the identical provisions in the Australian legislation: Z487 Ltd v 
Skelton, above n 52; Australian Gourmet Pastes Pty Ltd v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2017] VSCA 155, (2017) 
321 FLR 345; and Re Douglas Webber Events Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1544, (2014) 291 FLR 173. 
63  Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41. 
64  Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41. 
65  Z487 Ltd v Skelton, above n 52. 
66  Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41. 
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The application to stay the New Zealand proceedings was heard first. In that case, Lang J observed 
that the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act required the New Zealand court to stay the proceedings 
relating to the 2008 agreement, and prohibited the New Zealand court from staying the proceedings 
in relation to the 2010 agreement.67 He noted that the Australian court would be required not to stay 
its proceedings in relation to the 2008 agreement, with the result that "the dispute will necessarily be 
determined in a piecemeal way in both Australia and New Zealand".68 
Justice Lang went on to suggest that it was "open … to the courts in Queensland to elect not to 
determine the issues raised in the Queensland proceeding".69 His Honour seems to have drawn this 
conclusion from s 25(2)(e) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, which states that the New Zealand 
court is not required to stay proceedings in favour of an exclusive choice of court which designates 
Australian courts if the designated court has "decided not to determine" the matters in dispute within 
the scope of the agreement.70 As noted above, this provision is directly inconsistent with the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Acts' requirement that a court designated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement must not stay proceedings brought in accordance with the agreement unless the agreement 
is null and void. In other words, notwithstanding s 25(2)(e), it was not open to the Australian court to 
decide not to determine the matters in dispute beyond the scope of the agreement. Just as the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act insisted that the New Zealand courts "must not" stay proceedings in relation 
to the 2010 agreement, the Australian legislation required that the Queensland courts must not stay 
proceedings in relation to the 2008 agreement, unless the choice of court agreement was null and void 
under Australian law.71 
Clearly, the circumstance that arose in Skelton v Z487 Ltd – that the commercial relationship 
between the parties involved more than one contract, containing inconsistent exclusive choice of court 
agreements – had not occurred to those responsible for drafting the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts. 
They might be forgiven the omission in that it is not addressed in the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention either. In Skelton v Z487 Ltd, Lang J, assuming that the Queensland Court, which was yet 
to consider the jurisdictional challenge, might "elect not to determine the issues raised in the 
Queensland proceedings", decided that litigation should continue in New Zealand because the 
Australian court was not "the more appropriate court",72 by reference to the provision applicable when 
  
67  At [31]. 
68  At [31]. 
69  At [32]. 
70  This provision is discussed above nn 60–63 and associated text. 
71  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), s 20(1)(b). Atkinson J rejected an argument that the choice of 
Australian courts in the 2008 agreement was null and void: Z487 Ltd v Skelton, above n 52.  
72  Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41, at [32], referring to s 24 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. 
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there is no effective exclusive choice of court agreement.73 This course is simply not available under 
the Act, which neither contemplates nor provides for the possibility of multiple inconsistent exclusive 
choice of court agreements in related contracts between the same parties. While Lang J's attempt to 
craft a solution consistent with the purpose of the legislation in simplifying and expediting litigation 
on the preliminary jurisdictional issue is laudable, it is inconsistent with the rigid scheme of the 
legislation strictly to enforce exclusive choice of court agreements. This highlights the most important 
difference between the common law, which always preserves the court 's discretion not to enforce 
exclusive choice of court agreements74 – a discretion which is highly desirable, if not essential, in 
dealing with complex international commercial disputes involving multiple parties, multiple 
inconsistent agreements, or both – and the Hague Choice of Court Convention, which denies the court 
any such discretion.  
In the application to stay the Queensland proceedings in Z487 Ltd v Skelton, Atkinson J held that 
the 2008 agreement was separate from the 2010 agreement, and the exclusive choice of court in the 
2008 agreement, nominating the Australian courts, had to be enforced under the Australian Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act.75 Subsequent procedural decisions of the New Zealand High Court indicate 
that proceedings continued in New Zealand, but do not reveal how the jurisdictional stalemate was 
resolved.76 
2  Exclusive jurisdiction clauses outside the scope of the trans-Tasman regime 
The effect of jurisdiction clauses outside the scope of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act requires 
consideration both of the relevant rules of court, as well as of the case law. Under the rules of court, 
a defendant can challenge the jurisdiction of the New Zealand court; in determining whether the 
challenge is made out, the court must consider whether "New Zealand is the appropriate forum for 
the trial".77 The New Zealand courts refer to the residual common law in determining that issue, which 
requires that exclusive jurisdiction clauses should be enforced "unless there is strong cause or the 
  
73  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 24, discussed below nn 106–107 and associated text. 
74  See in particular Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, discussed below n 88 and 
associated text. 
75  Z487 Ltd v Skelton, above n 52, at [81], applying s 20(1)(b) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (Cth). 
76  Skelton v Z487 Ltd [2015] NZHC 1338; and Skelton v Z487 Ltd [2015] NZHC 1450.   
77  High Court Rules, r 6.28(5)(c), which requires the plaintiff to show, inter alia, that New Zealand is the 
appropriate forum for the trial. This is relevant for cases where initiating process was served outside New 
Zealand: High Court Rules, r 5.49, which refers to r 6.29. Rule 6.29(1)(a)(ii) in turn requires reference to be 
made to r 6.28(5)(b)–(d).  
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existence of exceptional circumstances" justifying non-enforcement.78 In Society of Lloyd's and 
Oxford Members' Agency Ltd v Hyslop, Richardson J stated that:79 
The existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause places a heavy burden on the party seeking to oppose the 
clause. While the Court has a discretion, a stay should be granted unless strong cause for not doing so is 
shown by the plaintiff. 
In a majority of cases,80 New Zealand courts have found that the plaintiff has not shown strong 
cause and have therefore enforced the foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause.81 In determining whether 
there is strong cause justifying non-enforcement, the New Zealand courts take into account factors 
identified by Brandon J in the influential English case Owners of Cargo lately laden on board ship or 
vessel Eleftheria v Owners of ship or vessel Eleftheria (The Eleftheria), as follows:82 
(a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect 
of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the [forum] and foreign courts; (b) 
Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so, whether it differs from [forum] law in any material 
respects; (c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely; (d) Whether the defendants 
genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages; (e) Whether the 
plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because they would: (i) be deprived 
of security for their claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar 
not applicable in [the forum]; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair 
trial. 
These are the same kinds of factors that are relevant in deciding jurisdiction challenges when there is 
no exclusive jurisdiction clause under the principle of forum non conveniens – namely, the factual 
and legal connections between the parties and the dispute to the forum and relevant foreign legal 
system.83 Although a higher standard is imposed when there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause, it is 
  
78  Advanced Cardiovascular Systems Inc v Universal Specialties Ltd [1997] 1 NZLR 186 (CA) [Universal 
Specialties Ltd (CA)] at 190. 
79  Society of Lloyd's and Oxford Members' Agency Ltd v Hyslop [1993] 3 NZLR 135 (CA) at 142 per Richardson 
J. Cooke P agreed with Richardson J at 138. 
80  In 2013, Ong stated that foreign exclusive jurisdiction clauses were enforced by New Zealand courts in nine 
out of 15 reported cases decided since 1990: Ong, above n 18, at 236, n 101. 
81  See for example Universal Specialties Ltd (CA), above n 78; Kidd v van Heeren [1998] 1 NZLR 324 (HC); 
and Seed Enhancements Ltd v Agrisource 2000 Ltd HC Auckland CIV 2010-404-004243, 18 November 2011. 
Compare Apple Computer Inc v Apple Corp SA [1990] 2 NZLR 598 (HC). 
82  Owners of Cargo lately laden on board ship or vessel Eleftheria v Owners of ship or vessel Eleftheria [1970] 
P 94 [The Eleftheria] at 100, adopted and applied by the Court of Appeal in Society of Lloyd's and Oxford 
Members' Agency Ltd v Hyslop, above n 79, at 143. 
83  See Schumacher v Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599 at [29]–[30]; and 
Exportrade Corporation v Irie Blue New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 675 at [38]–[39]. 
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unfortunate that the same test is applied whether there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause or not, and 
that ultimately the jurisdictional dispute is resolved by weighing various connections. This makes it 
difficult accurately to predict the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute, and might not appropriately 
protect exclusive jurisdiction clauses.84 It is in marked contrast to the treatment of exclusive choice 
of court agreements under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. 
New Zealand courts, as already noted, have generally taken a cosmopolitan approach to the effect 
of New Zealand public policy in the jurisdictional context. The potential non-application of forum 
public policy has been held to be not in itself a strong cause for non-enforcement of a foreign exclusive 
jurisdiction clause. In Society of Lloyd's and Oxford Members' Agency Ltd v Hyslop, in which the 
defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts on the basis of an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in favour of English courts, Richardson J, with whom Cooke P agreed, observed 
that:85 
… the Securities Act 1978 is designed to offer protection to New Zealand investors. Accordingly it may 
be said that it is for New Zealand Courts to determine whether foreigners who have come to New Zealand 
canvassing for capital have breached its provisions.  
However, his Honour went on to hold that this "in itself is not sufficient to counter the overwhelming 
weight of all the other considerations supporting England".86 If New Zealand legislation explicitly or 
implicitly invalidates a foreign jurisdiction clause,87 the clause will not be enforced. 
The common law recognises that an exclusive jurisdiction clause might and sometimes should 
yield to other considerations. In Donohue v Armco Inc, the House of Lords held that the English court 
might not enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause:88 
… where the interests of parties other than the parties bound by the exclusive jurisdiction clause are 
involved or grounds of claim not the subject of the clause are part of the relevant dispute so that there is a 
risk of parallel proceedings and inconsistent decisions. 
  
84  See similarly Ong, above n 18. 
85  Society of Lloyd's and Oxford Members' Agency Ltd v Hyslop, above n 79, at 143. 
86  At 143. Compare Apple Computer Inc, above n 81, in which it was held that if the proceedings concern New 
Zealand legislation and the court takes the view that foreign courts lack jurisdiction to apply that legislation, 
the court might refuse to enforce the foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause. 
87  See for example the Maritime Transport Act, s 210. 
88  Donohue v Armco Inc, above n 74, at [27]. See also General Equity Building Society v Squant 
Communications Private Ltd [2017] NZHC 1436 at [14]. 
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Eight Mile Style LLC v New Zealand National Party concerned a chain of contracts involving 
multiple parties.89 The fourth party objected to the jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts on the basis 
that its contract with the fifth third party contained an exclusive choice of United States courts. 
Dobson J found that the jurisdiction clause in question was not exclusive,90 but that even if it were, 
he would not have enforced it because "the importance of resolving all aspects of the substantive 
claim of breach of copyright does give sufficiently strong cause for the Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction not to stay the New Zealand proceeding".91 Likewise, if the New Zealand litigation 
involved a range of claims, only some of which were within the subject-matter scope of the foreign 
exclusive jurisdiction clause, the court might refuse to enforce the clause. 
Most New Zealand cases concern exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of foreign courts, but as 
a matter of principle, exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of New Zealand courts should be 
determined in the same way: that is, enforced unless there is strong cause for non-enforcement.92 
While the courts would be unlikely to stay proceedings if the parties agreed to litigate exclusively in 
the forum, they might find that there was strong cause justifying doing so if the litigation in another 
country involved third parties who were not bound by the jurisdiction clause, or matters beyond the 
subject-matter scope of the jurisdiction clause, because the public interest in preventing multiplicity 
of litigation may outweigh the parties' private interests in having jurisdictional agreements enforced. 
The English courts have had to deal with jurisdictional disputes involving multiple contracts 
containing inconsistent exclusive jurisdiction clauses. UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG involved a series 
of related contracts, containing different "exclusive" jurisdiction clauses. Lord Collins held that the 
prevailing clause was that contained in "the agreements which are at the commercial centre of the 
transaction" and suggested that this would be consistent with the parties' intentions.93 A related issue 
arises in the context of inconsistent arbitration and jurisdiction clauses. Garnett's suggestion to resolve 
conflicting dispute resolution clauses is that the tribunal which was "more appropriate to resolve the 
dispute" should prevail, taking into account the tribunal that was seised first.94 That suggestion 
resembles the solution proposed by Lang J in Skelton v Z487 Ltd, discussed above.95  
  
89  Eight Mile Style LLC v New Zealand National Party, above n 34. 
90  This aspect of the case is discussed above nn 34–37 and associated text. 
91  Eight Mile Style LLC v New Zealand National Party, above n 34, at [68]. 
92  Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [53].  
93  UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG [2009] EWCA Civ 585, [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 272 at [95]. 
94  Richard Garnett "Coexisting and conflicting jurisdiction and arbitration clauses" (2013) 9 J Priv Int L 361 at 
370. 
95  See nn 72–73 and associated text. 
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3  Protection of exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
The principal protection given to exclusive jurisdiction clauses is in the principles relating to 
staying or dismissing proceedings, as already discussed. The court might also protect an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in two other ways: first, by awarding an anti-suit injunction to prevent the 
commencement or continuation of proceedings in a foreign forum other than that nominated in an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause; and second, by awarding damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause.  
(a)  Anti-suit injunctions 
It is necessary to consider trans-Tasman proceedings separately from proceedings outside that 
regime. Whether New Zealand (and Australian) courts can award anti-suit injunctions to protect 
exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Trans-Tasman legislation is an 
interesting question which has not yet been considered by the courts in either country. The Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act provides that:96  
A New Zealand court must not restrain a person from commencing a civil proceeding in an Australian 
court on the grounds that the Australian court is not the appropriate forum for the proceeding . 
This provision might have been intended to apply in all cases, including where there is an exclusive 
choice of court agreement in favour of the New Zealand courts. But on its clear wording, it does not 
apply in such a case because the ground on which the injunction would be sought is not that the 
Australian court is inappropriate, but rather that the exclusive choice of court agreement should be 
enforced; the appropriateness of the Australian forum is not explicitly relevant to that question under 
the Act. It would be consistent with the strong protection of exclusive choice of court agreements 
under the Act, with the express words of s 28(1), and with relevant Australian authority,97 for the 
remedy of an anti-suit injunction to be available to enjoin a party from commencing or continuing 
Australian proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the 
New Zealand courts. 
Outside the scope of the trans-Tasman regime, New Zealand courts certainly have jurisdiction to 
grant anti-suit injunctions, and although there appear to be no cases in which an anti-suit injunction 
has been granted to prevent the commencement or continuation of foreign proceedings brought in 
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the New Zealand courts, the courts could 
certainly grant an anti-suit injunction in such circumstances. 
  
96  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 28(1) (emphasis added). 
97  See Great Southern Loans v Locator Group [2005] NSWSC 438 at [75]–[77], discussing s 21 of the Service 
and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) which applies to the context of intra-Australian litigation and is in 
very similar terms to s 28(1) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. See also Mortensen, above n 5, at 85. 
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(b)  Damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause? 
The issue as to the availability of damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause has not 
yet arisen in New Zealand. The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act makes no reference to any such 
remedy; its silence on this point could be argued both to support and not to support the availability of 
damages. By not explicitly prohibiting the remedy, the Act could be said implicitly to permit it. On 
the other hand, by not explicitly making the remedy available, the Act could be said implicitly to deny 
its availability. It is suggested that it would be consistent with the Act's explicit description of 
jurisdiction clauses as choice of court agreements to allow a contractual remedy for breach.98 
For exclusive jurisdiction clauses outside the scope of that legislation, the question as to whether 
damages are available for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause has not arisen directly in New 
Zealand. In England and Australia, at least in principle, damages may be awarded for breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause.99 In Vero Liability Insurance Ltd v Heartland Bank Ltd, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal implied that, as an exception to the general rule that damages cannot be 
awarded for the costs of pursuing a claim,100 damages might be available if a party had successfully 
applied for a stay of local proceedings in support of an arbitration agreement.101 The same reasoning 
applies to exclusive jurisdiction agreements.102 If the exclusive jurisdiction clause nominated a 
foreign court, and the New Zealand court ordered a stay of proceedings brought in New Zealand in 
breach of that clause, awarding damages for breach is relatively straightforward. But if the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause nominated New Zealand courts and was breached by a party bringing proceedings 
in a foreign court which interpreted the clause differently to the New Zealand court, the foreign court's 
decision in relation to the effect of the jurisdiction clause may give rise to an issue estoppel103 which 
would prevent the award of damages by a New Zealand court.   
  
98  See Mukarrum Ahmed and Paul Beaumont "Exclusive choice of court agreements: some issues on the Hague 
Convention on choice of court agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I recast especially anti -suit 
injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT" (2017) 13 J Priv Int L 386 (referring 
to the Hague Choice of Court Convention, above n 20, on which the Act is based). 
99  Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2013] UKSC 70, [2014] 1 All ER 590; 
Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes v Wilson (1954) 94 CLR 577 at 587; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v White (No 2) [2004] VSC 268; and Pipeline Services WA Pty Ltd v Atco Gas Australia Pty Ltd 
[2014] WASC 10 at [8]–[25]. See also Albert Dinelli "The Limits on the Remedy of Damages for Breach of 
Jurisdiction Agreements: The Law of Contract Meets Private International Law" (2015) 38 MULR 1023. 
100  The Court cited Berry v British Transport Commission [1962] 1 QB 306 (CA) at 316–317, 319 and 320–321; 
Herbison v Papakura Video Ltd (No 2) [1987] 2 NZLR 720 (HC) at 735; Simpson v Walker [2012] NZCA 
191, (2012) 28 FRNZ 815; and Boswell v Millar [2014] NZCA 314, [2014] 3 NZLR 332 at [50]. 
101  Vero Liability Insurance Ltd v Heartland Bank Ltd (Formerly Marac Finance Ltd) [2015] NZCA 288 at [111]. 
102  A v B (No 2) [2007] EWHC 54 (Comm) at [10]–[11]. 
103  See Dinelli, above n 99, at 1039. 
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C  Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses 
Non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are usually defined as mere submissions to the jurisdiction of 
the nominated court.104 In general,105 they should have different legal effects to exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses because they are not taken to imply that the parties agree not to litigate in courts other than 
those nominated in the clause. The treatment of non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses under the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act and at common law is similar. Under both regimes, it makes no difference, 
at least in principle, whether the non-exclusive jurisdiction clause is in favour of the forum or of 
foreign courts. 
1  Non-exclusive choice of court agreements under the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act 
Jurisdiction clauses which fall outside the definition of "exclusive choice of court agreements" in 
the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, including non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses,106 have a very 
different effect.  They are merely one of eight listed factors107 that the New Zealand courts must take 
into account in determining whether they should stay proceedings on the basis that an Australian court 
is "the more appropriate court for the proceeding". The legislation does not indicate the weight to be 
given to such agreements. The legislation came into effect in October 2013; as at the time of writing, 
there were no published New Zealand or Australian cases discussing this particular factor in detail. It 
seems likely that the cases dealing with the effect of non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses at common 
law will be influential in cases decided under the Act, because, as explained below, the common law 
has traditionally treated non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in a similar way – as a factor which is 
relevant to determining whether New Zealand is the appropriate forum to hear and determine the 
dispute. 
2  Non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses at common law 
For cases outside the scope of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, there are two different 
approaches manifest in the New Zealand cases. The first is the same as in the Act: a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause is merely one of several factors relevant to the court's determination as to whether 
it should exercise its jurisdiction. The negative effect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause will arise 
  
104  JJ Fawcett "Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in Private International Law" [2001] LMCLQ 234 at 235. See 
similarly Sensation Yachts Ltd v Darby Maritime Ltd HC Auckland M1146-sw02, 25 October 2002 at [32]. 
105  There are English cases in which some non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of English courts have 
been given similar protection to exclusive jurisdiction clauses in favour of the English courts, in that the courts 
have issued anti-suit injunctions to prevent the commencement or continuation of proceedings brought in a 
foreign court. See further below nn 117–120 and 124 and associated text.  
106  As well as all jurisdiction clauses in consumer and employment contracts, which are excluded from the 
definition of "exclusive choice of court agreements": Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 25(4)(b) and (c). 
107  Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, s 24(2). 
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if the foreign defendant protests the jurisdiction,108 in which case the plaintiff must establish, among 
other things, that New Zealand is "the appropriate forum for the trial".109 This requires consideration 
of which of the competing fora has "the most real and substantial connection" to the dispute.110 The 
existence of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause is relevant to that question,111 in addition to "factors 
affecting convenience or expense (such as availability of witnesses), the law governing the relevant 
transaction and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry on business".112 Although 
Ong suggested in 2013 that New Zealand courts give "little weight to non-exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses",113 cases since show that this is changing. In Haines v Herd, Associate Judge Bell stated that 
the foreign non-exclusive jurisdiction clause placed "a higher burden" on the applicant for a stay to 
show that New Zealand was more appropriate than the foreign court nominated in the clause than 
would apply if there were no jurisdiction clause.114 Nonetheless, ultimately that clause "only 
reinforce[d]" the conclusion that Vanuatu was the natural forum.115 Similarly, in Ttah Ltd v 
Koninklijke Ten Cate NV, Edwards J said it was "significant" that the parties had chosen New Zealand 
law and included a non-exclusive choice of New Zealand courts.116  
The second approach has only recently begun to emerge in New Zealand. It resembles the 
approach taken in some English cases which do not determine the effect of non-exclusive jurisdiction 
clauses by reference to the forum non conveniens principle.117 In these cases, a similar standard is 
applied to non-exclusive as to exclusive jurisdiction clauses; that is, these decisions required that non-
exclusive jurisdiction clauses should be protected, often by anti-suit injunction, unless the party 
  
108  High Court Rules, r 5.49.  
109  Rules 6.28(5)(c) and 6.29(1)(a)(ii). 
110  Wing Hung Printing Co Ltd v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2010] NZCA 502, [2011] 1 NZLR 754 at [45]–[46]. 
111  At [46].  
112  Exportrade Corporation v Irie Blue New Zealand Ltd [2013] NZCA 675 at [39(c)]; and Schumacher v 
Summergrove Estates Ltd [2014] NZCA 412, [2014] 3 NZLR 599 at [29]. 
113  Ong, above n 18, at 228. 
114  Haines v Herd [2015] NZHC 3365 at [83]. 
115  At [95]. 
116  Ttah Ltd v Koninklijke Ten Cate NV [2016] NZHC 237 at [50]. 
117  Gloster J summarised this approach in Antec International Ltd v Biosafety USA Inc [2006] EWHC 47 (Comm) 
at [7]. The same approach has recently been endorsed and applied by the Singapore Court of Appeal: see 
Shanghai Turbo Enterprises Ltd v Liu Ming [2019] SGCA 11, and is also applied in Hong Kong: see Noble 
Power Investments Ltd v Nissei Stomach Tokyo Co Ltd [2008] 5 HKLRD 631. 
 JURISDICTION CLAUSES IN NEW ZEALAND LAW 651 
  
resisting enforcement demonstrated strong reasons118 why the court nominated in the clause – usually, 
the forum court – was not an appropriate jurisdiction.119 Factors that were foreseeable at the time the 
agreement was concluded cannot be taken into account.120 A number of these English cases were 
cited by Associate Judge Bell with apparent approval in Haines v Herd,121 although in that case the 
non-exclusive jurisdiction clause was still treated as relevant to the forum non conveniens enquiry. 
In two cases decided in 2018, Associate Judge Smith held that non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
in favour of New Zealand courts are significant in determining jurisdictional challenges. In the first, 
Vector Ltd v Sunverge Energy Inc, his Honour stated that the parties' express submission to the non-
exclusive jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts was a "powerful consideration … on the appropriate 
forum issue".122 In Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd,123 in obiter, Associate Judge Smith 
quoted a passage from Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, a decision of 
the English Court of Appeal, in which Toulson LJ stated that:124 
… by agreeing to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of state X the parties implicitly agree that X is 
an appropriate jurisdiction, and therefore either party should have to show a strong reason for later arguing 
that it is not an appropriate jurisdiction.  
Without explicitly adopting that position, Associate Judge Smith suggested that his own statement in 
Vector Ltd v Sunverge Energy Inc, that a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause was a "powerful 
  
118  In some cases, even stronger language is used: in Antec International Ltd, above n 117, at [7(ii)], Gloster J 
held that "overwhelming, or at least very strong, reasons" had to be shown by the party challenging their 
obligation to submit to the English courts (emphasis added). 
119  Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, above n 2, at [64], cited in Heli Holdings Ltd 
v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [50]. This is a slightly different inquiry to that which pertains to 
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. In the case of the non-exclusive clause, the test is whether the party resisting 
the clause can demonstrate strong reasons why the nominated court is not an appropriate jurisdiction. For 
exclusive clauses, the question is whether the party challenging the clause can demonstrate strong reasons 
why the clause should not be enforced. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Louise Merrett and Janeen 
Carruthers "United Kingdom: Giving Effect to Optional Choice of Court Agreements – Interpretation, 
Operation and Enforcement" in Mary Keyes (ed) Optional Choice of Court Agreements in Private 
International Law (Springer, Cham (Switzerland), 2020) 443. 
120  Antec International Ltd, above n 117, at [7].  
121  Haines v Herd, above n 114, at [80]–[81]. 
122  Vector Ltd v Sunverge Energy Inc [2018] NZHC 1936 at [95]. His Honour used the same phrase ("a powerful 
consideration … on the appropriate forum issue") in his decision in the later case Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper 
Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [50]. 
123  Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [32]. 
124  Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, above n 2, at [64]. 
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consideration … on the appropriate forum issue"125 was "[t]o similar effect".126 However, his Honour 
also recognised that:127  
While it is clear that even an exclusive jurisdiction clause can be overridden if exceptional circumstances 
exist which would justify denying the contractual provision its operative effect, the bar is set lower where 
the jurisdiction clause is non-exclusive. 
The status of non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in New Zealand law has, therefore, become 
somewhat unclear. There is a clear trend to give non-exclusive clauses greater weight than in earlier 
decisions – which is a positive development – and several cases have referred approvingly to English 
authorities that give non-exclusive clauses a similar status to exclusive clauses. Whether the New 
Zealand courts will take the next step, following English, Singaporean and Hong Kong authority, in 
more strictly protecting non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses, particularly by means of anti-suit 
injunction, remains to be seen. Whether that would be a desirable development is not certain.128 
3  Protection of non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
As already explained, non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are relevant to a court's decision whether 
to stay proceedings, both under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act and otherwise. In Deutsche Bank 
AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, Toulson LJ noted that "a jurisdiction clause which is 
not fully exclusive may nevertheless be drafted in such a way as to have the effect of barring parallel 
proceedings in certain circumstances".129 In that case, an anti-suit injunction might be awarded to 
prevent the commencement or continuation of foreign proceedings, where the parties had nominated 
the forum court in a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. This would not be possible under the Trans-
Tasman Proceedings Act; the effect of any choice of court agreement which is not exclusive under 
the Act is relevant to whether the Australian court is the (more) appropriate forum,130 and the Act 
prohibits a New Zealand court from granting an anti-suit injunction in those circumstances.131 
It may well be otherwise in cases outside the trans-Tasman regime. In particular, it would be 
consistent with the two cases referred to above, in which Associate Judge Smith cited the English 
  
125  Vector Ltd v Sunverge Energy Inc, above n 122, at [95]. 
126  Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [50]. 
127  At [53]. 
128  This second approach has been criticised for discriminating in favour of jurisdiction clauses that nominate 
forum courts, and for blurring the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses: see 
UBS AG v Telesto Investments Ltd [2011] 4 SLR 503 at [120]; and BP plc v AON [2005] EWHC 2554 (Comm) 
at [23]. 
129  Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, above n 2, at [105].  
130  Section 24(2)(d). 
131  Section 28. 
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Court of Appeal's reasoning in Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP with 
approval,132 for a New Zealand court to grant an anti-suit injunction to protect a non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in favour of New Zealand courts, if it found that the clause was "drafted in such a 
way as to have the effect of barring parallel proceedings".133  
D  Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses 
The discussion in this article has so far proceeded on the basis that jurisdiction clauses are 
symmetric in their effect on the parties: that is, that they apply to the parties equally. It is not 
uncommon to find jurisdiction clauses which purport to affect the parties differently. Such asymmetric 
jurisdiction clauses may bind only one party (these are sometimes called "unilateral" jurisdiction 
clauses), or combine exclusive and non-exclusive components (these are also called "one-sided" 
jurisdiction clauses). For example, the jurisdiction clause at issue in Advanced Cardiovascular 
Systems Inc v Universal Specialties Ltd provided that:134 
In case of any litigation arising out of any dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation or the 
compliance with this Agreement, the parties hereby expressly declare to accept the jurisdiction of the 
California Courts. However, ACS [the defendant] shall be entitled at its discretion to seek relief in a court 
of competent jurisdiction in the district in which DISTRIBUTOR [the plaintiff] is domiciled. 
The latter type of clause is quite common. Generally such clauses purport to limit the jurisdictional 
options of one party, usually requiring that party to litigate exclusively at the home courts of the 
counter party, while preserving more jurisdictional options for the counter party, often enabling the 
counter party to litigate wherever the first party (or its assets) can be located at the time that 
proceedings are commenced.135 There is a lively and extensive debate about the legitimacy and effect 
of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, particularly in Europe. Whereas the English courts routinely 
enforce asymmetric jurisdiction clauses and regard them as an entirely unexceptional exercise of party 
autonomy, the French Cour de Cassation has refused to enforce them in some cases, including in the 
controversial decision of Madame X v Société Banque Privé Edmond de Rothschild.136  
  
132  Vector Ltd v Sunverge Energy Inc, above n 122; and Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2. 
133  Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP, above n 2, at [105].  
134  Universal Specialties Ltd (CA), above n 78, at 188. 
135  See in general Mary Keyes and Brooke Adele Marshall "Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, optional and 
asymmetrical" (2015) 11 J Priv Int L 345. 
136  Madame X v Société Banque Privé Edmond de Rothschild Cass civ, 1ère, 26 September 2012. This case and 
a number of subsequent – not entirely consistent – decisions of the French Cour de Cassation are discussed 
in detail by François Mailhé "France: A Game of Asymmetries, Optional and Asymmetrical Choice of Court 
Agreements under French Case Law" in Mary Keyes (ed) Optional Choice of Court Agreements in Private 
International Law (Springer, Cham (Switzerland), 2020) 197. See also Keyes and Marshall "Jurisdiction 
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The legitimacy of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses has not been directly raised in New Zealand, 
although there are cases involving such clauses. In these cases, the New Zealand courts have 
addressed only the relevant component of the clause (which has usually been the exclusive aspect), 
treated them as enforceable and have not expressly commented on the asymmetric nature of the 
clause.137 For example, the jurisdiction clause in Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd provided 
that:138 
Lessor and Lessee hereby expressly submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the New Zealand Courts 
situated in the courts of New Zealand [sic]. Lessee further agrees that any legal action or proceeding 
against it or in any of its assets [sic] may be brought in New Zealand or in any jurisdiction where Lessee 
or any of its assets may be found. 
Associate Judge Smith interpreted the second sentence of this clause to create exclusive jurisdiction 
only for claims brought by the lessor. He did not remark on the asymmetric nature of this clause.139 
In the related context of unilateral arbitration clauses, there is New Zealand authority that such clauses 
are enforceable.140 It seems likely that if the issue directly arose, the New Zealand courts would 
likewise hold asymmetric jurisdiction clauses to be effective, although this may not be appropriate 
under the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. This is because of the view expressed in the Explanatory 
Report to the Hague Choice of Court Convention that the Convention does not apply to asymmetric 
choice of court agreements.141 Given the influence of that Convention on the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act, it might follow that the exclusive components of asymmetric agreements are outside 
the scope of that legislation. This question has not yet been considered by either the New Zealand or 
Australian courts. 
  
agreements: exclusive, optional and asymmetrical", above n 135; and Merrett and Carruthers, above n 119, at 
481–496. 
137  However, in Universal Specialties Ltd (HC), above n 31, at 7–8, Tompkins J took into account the fact that 
the clause gave the defendant, but not the plaintiff, the option to litigate in another court in determining that 
the main part of the clause was exclusive so far as the plaintiff was concerned.  
138  Heli Holdings Ltd v Chopper Worx Pty Ltd, above n 2, at [25]. 
139  In Universal Specialties Ltd (HC), above n 31, at 8, Tompkins J noted without criticism that the clause 
reflected the parties' intention that it bind only the plaintiff and not the defendant. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeal did not remark on this aspect of the clause: see Universal Specialties Ltd (CA), above n 78. 
140  Kawakawa Station Ltd v New Zealand Walking Access Commission [2019] NZHC 791 at [35]. 
141  Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 40, at [106]. See also Keyes and Marshall "Jurisdiction agreements: exclusive, 
optional and asymmetrical", above n 135, at 366; and Adeline Chong "Singapore: A Mix of Traditional and 
New Rules" in Keyes (ed) Optional Choice of Court Agreements in Private International Law (Springer, 
Cham (Switzerland), 2020) 325. Compare Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc [2017] 
EWHC 161 (Comm), 1 WLR 3497 at [74]; and Merrett and Carruthers, above n 119, at 493–494.  
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IV CONCLUSION 
It is often asserted that jurisdiction clauses create certainty about how jurisdictional disputes will 
be resolved and therefore reduce the scope for and intensity of preliminary jurisdictional skirmishes 
in international cases.142 This is in both the public and the parties' interests. However, the benefits of 
jurisdiction clauses will be undermined if the principles concerning their effect are unclear, or courts 
are too ready not to enforce them. 
Some commentators have suggested that the New Zealand cases have insufficiently protected 
jurisdiction clauses, particularly exclusive jurisdiction clauses.143 Under the common law, New 
Zealand courts treat exclusive and non-exclusive clauses in a similar way, applying similar principles 
to those that are used to resolve jurisdictional challenges in the absence of any agreement. This may 
undermine the effect of jurisdictional clauses and may create an incentive to parties to challenge 
jurisdictional agreements. The New Zealand courts have expressed divergent views about the weight 
to be given to non-exclusive clauses, making it difficult to anticipate with certainty how a 
jurisdictional challenge will be resolved. 
The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act is a welcome, although partial, improvement on the common 
law in its much stronger and clearer protection of exclusive choice of court agreements. However, 
this comes at the price of removing the court's discretion not to enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
in exceptional cases, which is especially important in complex litigation. In terms of non-exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses, the Act mirrors the common law: non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses are one of 
several factors relevant to deciding whether the court should stay or dismiss proceedings because it is 
not the appropriate court to hear the dispute. Like the common law, the Act does not indicate the 
weight non-exclusive clauses are to be given. This is not an improvement on the common law. 
It remains to be seen whether the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act will, over time, influence the 
common law, whether at the level of nomenclature (will we begin to use the term "choice of court 
agreement" instead of jurisdiction clause?), or at the more important level of principle (will exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses be given stronger protection?). The early indication, from the one New Zealand 
case that has dealt with choice of court agreements under the Act, is that the influence might be in the 
opposite direction,144 or at least that change might be a while coming. Skelton v Z487 Ltd suggests 
  
142  Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Downey HC Auckland CIV-2001-404-4096, 25 October 2011 at [28]. 
143  Ong, above n 18, at 229–230; and Giora Shapira and Ronen Lazarovitch "Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses – A 
New Zealand Perspective on the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements" (2008) 23 NZULR 216 
at 220. 
144  This is so both in terms of form and substance. In Skelton v Z487 Ltd, above n 41, Lang J referred to the 
relevant terms as "jurisdiction clauses" eight times. The term "choice of court agreements" also appears in the 
judgment eight times, but all but one of those occurs in quotes from ss 24 and 25 of the Trans-Tasman 
Proceedings Act. His Honour also resolved the clash between inconsistent exclusive choice of court 
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that the courts may be likely to remain convinced of the relative superiority of the flexible common 
law regime and perhaps inclined to favour it over the rigidity of the legislative scheme. 
  
agreements by reference to the common law method of identifying the country which was the more 
appropriate forum. 
